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Making “Mediterranean Migrants”:
Geopolitical Transitions, Migratory
Policy, and French Conceptions of
the Mediterranean in the 20th
Century
Michael A. Kozakowski
1 In a series of articles in the 1920s that were read and widely discussed in France and
abroad, the journalist Ambroise Got argued that the migration and naturalization of
some groups were advantageous to the nation and that others were harmful. He singled
out Polish Jews for their supposed undesirability and nonassimilability. In contrast, he
claimed that Italian and Spanish migrants would merge with and strengthen the French
nation.  This  was  analogous  to  the  unification  of  different  French  regions  or  the
somewhat mythical mixing of Gauls, Romans, and Franks in previous centuries. Yet the
greatest and most concrete proof for Got was in Algeria. There, in the face of a hostile
climate and an indigenous majority,  French,  Italian,  and Spanish settlers  had fused
together, giving rise to a “Mediterranean race.” “We have succeeded in unifying the
European population of Algeria,” he proclaimed, “to melt it down in the same mold
whence now arises a new Mediterranean race…” This Mediterranean race of migrants,
he further asserted, had proven itself intensely loyal to the French nation during the
recent conflict.1
2 World War I had unleashed several processes that remade the Mediterranean region
and  revealed  to  contemporary  observers  like  Got  the  dynamics  of  political  and
demographic relations.  The Mediterranean had been a site  of  Great Power tensions
leading up to the conflict (e.g., in both the Ottoman Empire and Morocco), an active
theater of combat (e.g., the Gallipoli Campaign), and of post-war colonial spoils in the
form of mandates awarded to France and Britain in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. Most
relevantly,  the  war  had  led  to  widespread  mobilization  and  migration  in  the
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Mediterranean,  not  least  in  France.  The  war  mobilized  hundreds  of  thousands  of
colonial  soldiers,  including  170,000 Algerians.2 In  metropolitan  France,  they  were
joined by thousands of other colonial subjects,  Chinese, and Spaniards who took up
work in armaments factories or replaced farmers who went to the front.  Migration
continued after  the  fighting ceased,  as  Italians,  Spaniards,  and Algerians  –and to  a
lesser extent Czechs, Poles, and members of other nationalities– made whole some of
France’s economic and demographic losses. As Got’s essays demonstrate, this migratory
boom –which saw nearly 2.3 million foreigners legally enter France between 1921 and
1939 3– set off debates not just about the economic and military benefits of migration or
naturalization, but about how to understand French and migrants’ identities.
3 The Mediterranean Basin was the largest source of migrants to France when Got was
writing and remained so for most of the 20th century. Spaniards, Italians, and Algerians,
alone, constituted at least 40% of the foreign population in France on every census
between  1901  and  1982,  and  often  substantially  more.4 It  was  no  coincidence  that
commentators like Got articulated ideas about migrants in terms of the Mediterranean,
a region of increasing intellectual, imperial, and economic interest since the late 18th
 century. Even today, representations of migrants in France and elsewhere in Western
Europe  are  closely  bound  up  with  conceptions  of  the  Mediterranean  as  a  frontier
region.  These  conceptions  are  reproduced  and  disseminated  through  images  of
capsized boats carrying would-be migrants across the Mediterranean to Lampedusa,
Andalusia,  and  other  entry  points  to  the  European  Union.  However,  it  is  hitherto
unclear  in  the  scholarly  literature  how French discourses  about  the  Mediterranean
relate to discourses about migrants.5 Whereas the latter are frequently examined to
reveal conceptions of the French nation-state and French identity,  “Mediterranean”
discourses are often examined from the perspective of intellectual history, as scholars
trace how the Mediterranean came to be a unit of study for statesmen, policymakers,
and scholars like Fernand Braudel.6
4 This article analyzes both how French debates about migrants drew on discourses of
“the  Mediterranean,”  and  how  migratory  patterns  and  debates  reveal  changing
conceptions of “the Mediterranean” itself. In so doing, it also reveals the frontiers of
“Europe,” as notions of the Mediterranean were a construct of European persons at a
time of imperial expansion, thinking explicitly about Europe’s geography, sub-climates,
fauna  and  flora,  races,  and  political  relations  vis-à-vis  other  world  regions.7 In
understanding these interconnected discourses of migrants,  the Mediterranean, and
Europe,  it  is  helpful  to  think of  spaces  like  the  Mediterranean as  social  constructs
whose boundaries changed over time, rather than predetermined, neutral spaces. They
were  defined  not  just  by  physical  geography,  but  by  sustained  political,  economic,
social, and economic exchanges; the articulation of identities; and at times, juridical or
administrative bodies.8
5 In order to see how these geographies, interactions, and conceptions of migrants and
the  Mediterranean  have  changed  over  time,  this  article  analyzes  geopolitical
transitions in the 20th century. Like World War I, these were upheavals that remade –
and thus reveal– political, economic, and social relations in the Mediterranean. Looking
back  on  the  20th century,  it  is  possible  to  identify  several  major  shifts  in  French
migratory policy and discourses linked to geopolitical events, including World War I
and the convergent rise of fascism, anti-colonialism, and World War II in the first half
of  the  20th century.  Decolonization  and  European  integration  occurred  roughly
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simultaneously in the 1950s and 1960s. Then beginning in 1973, the European Economic
Community (EEC), predecessor to the European Union, was enlarged for the first time,
sparking a new approach to European-Mediterranean relations at the same time as the
First Oil Crisis signaled the beginning of a sustained economic downturn. 
 
Colonial Myths and Post-World War I Migration Policy
6 World War I and postwar reconstruction led to unprecedented numbers of migrants in
France.  The  official  Italian  population  in  the  country  increased  by  more  than
300,000 between 1911 and 1926 to 760,000; the Spanish population trebled to 320,000.9
Whereas  the  Algerian  community  numbered  perhaps  4,000  in  all  of  metropolitan
France in 1910, some 70,000 migrants made the journey across the Mediterranean in
1924, alone.10 Yet these migrant groups were conceptualized very differently.
7 Most  Algerian migrants  in  France after  World War I  were  indigenous Muslims who
spoke Berber, particularly from the Kabyle Mountains of northeastern Algeria. Because
Algeria was technically an extension of French territory, they were French nationals.
However, they were denied the right to vote and in Algeria were governed by a distinct
legal  system of  local,  or  “Muslim law,”  rather  than  the  common,  or  civil  law that
governed the European settlers and the majority of indigenous Algerian Jews. Kabyles
may  have  benefited  from  slightly  more  favorable  stereotypes  towards  them  than
towards Arabs.11 However, there was no legal preference in France during the 1920s for
either  hiring  Kabyle  over  Arab  migrants  or  Algerian  migrants  (who were,  after  all
French nationals) over foreign migrants.
8 In  metropolitan France,  administrators  and employers  often characterized Algerian
migrants as “unstable” and “nomadic.” Nomadism, a trait most closely associated with
Arabs,  but  occasionally  with Berbers  as  well,  was  a  long-standing trope in  colonial
studies.  The distinction between nomadism and sedentary civilisation featured in de
Tocqueville’s  accounts  of  Algeria  in  the  mid-19th century  and  gained  academic
acceptance at the turn of the century among the followers of the geographer,  Paul
Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918),  who contrasted nomadic and sedentary genres de vie
(lifeways).12 The supposed “instability” of Algerian and North African migrants was to
be a recurring refrain throughout the mid-20th century, and was said to include higher
absenteeism on the job, a propensity to change jobs, and frequent changes of residence.
In  short,  Algerian migrants  were  reputed to  be  poor  workers  and in  need of  close
“supervision.”13
9 These unfavorable stereotypes of indigenous Muslims in colonial Algeria, transferred to
Algerian  migrants  in  metropolitan  France,  contrasted  with  stereotypes  of  “Latin”
migrants from Southern Europe. Discourses of “Latinity” (Latinité) had been prominent
in the mid-19th century under Napoleon III,  who sought to capture the glory of  the
Roman  Empire,  improve  relations  with  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  increase
France’s influence in “Latin America.” After France’s defeat to Prussia during the war of
1870-1871,  these  discourses  largely  fell  out  of  favor.14 However,  they  flourished  in
regional contexts, such as in the work of poet Frédéric Mistral in Provence, as well as in
Algeria. 
10 About half of European migrants in Algeria were from France, with the rest hailing
from  Spain,  Italy,  Malta,  and  a  handful  of  other  countries.  Street  names,  cultural
associations,  a  distinct regional  French accent and slang,  shared experiences in the
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army (particularly during World War I), and shared housing and employment all helped
create a sense of a shared “Latin” culture among French, Spanish, and Italian migrants.
15 Furthermore  in  elevating  a  Christian-Roman  past,  relatively  recent  European
migrants could preempt the claims of Arab Muslims, who could be dismissed as outside
“invaders”  who  first  came  in  the  7th century.  Archaeologists  and  tour  companies
promoted Roman ruins in places like Djemila and Timgad, while the bishop of Algiers,
Charles  Martial  Lavigerie  (1825-1892)  promoted  knowledge  of  early  Christianity  in
Algeria. “Algerianist” writers, such as Louis Bertrand (1866-1941), later elected to the
Académie Française, celebrated the supposed fusion of “Latin” migrants living in Algeria.
He argued that these “Latins” had the ability to reinvigorate France due to their alleged
virility and rebarbarisation living adjacent to indigenous Arabs.16
11 These stereotypes of “Latin migrants” were re-imported to metropolitan France after
World War I. “Latin” discourses had been revived in wartime propaganda to contrast
Franco-Italian partnership  and  civilisation against  “Germanic  barbarism.”  After  the
conflict, this language of Latinity and the example of migrants in Algeria provided key
means for debating migration in France. While not all French commentators were in
favor of migration, those in favor tended to prefer “Latin” Spanish and Italian migrants
as  most  easy  to  assimilate.  Even  those  who  ranked  “Germanic”  nationalities  more
highly  were  concerned  that  racial  and  class  “superiors”  were  being  sedentarized,
corrupted by “civilization,” and “selfishly” using birth control. In contrast, migrants
from  Italy  and  Spain  exhibited  higher  birth  rates.  These  higher  birth  rates  were
attributed not to Catholicism, as many migrants were not active practitioners, but to a
supposed physical  virility  or  even “uncouthness”  that  would  invigorate  the  French
nation.17 The 1927 naturalization reforms that resulted from these debates considerably
eased the terms of naturalization, but permitted local officials considerable discretion
to decide whether the candidate would contribute to the national community. Given
favorable stereotypes and large numbers of migrants, two-thirds of naturalized adults
from 1927 through 1939 were Spaniards and Italians.18
12 During the 1920s and 1930s, these discourses about Spaniards and Italians as “Latin”
migrants  increasingly  merged  with or  were  supplanted  by  discourses  of
“Mediterranean”  migrants,  as  academics  and  policy  makers  sought  to  use  more
“scientific,” rather than “cultural,” racial markers. While some scholars have detected
evidence of thinking about a race méditerranéenne as early as the mid-1830s, the term
did not gain much traction until the last quarter of the century. In the late 19th century
and  early  20th century  however,  anthropologists  actively  sought  out  more  physical
groundings  for  their  discipline,  based  on  the  natural  world  and  incorporating
methodologies like anthropometry, cranial morphology, and psychology, rather than
an older, more humanistic traditions of race explored through history, culture, and
linguistics.  Hence  cultural,  historical,  and  linguistic  names  of  supposed  races  like
“Latin,”  “Celtic,”  and “Aryan/Germanic”  were often replaced by geographic  names,
such as “Mediterranean,” “Alpine,” and “Nordic.”
13 Anthropologists,  geographers,  and  demographers  had  mixed  feelings  about  the  so-
called  “Mediterranean  race.”  For  some  French  anthropologists,  like  the  notorious
Joseph  Arthur  de  Gobineau  (1816-1882)  or  the  Berber  expert  Lucien  Bertholon
(1854-1914), the Mediterranean represented a mixing of persons or perhaps a mixed
race with notions  of  “degeneracy.”  For  Joseph Deniker  (1852-1918),  held  in  greater
esteem by the French establishment, the “Atlanto-Mediterranean” (or “Littoral”) race
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was one of six main European races. Inspired by the German, Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919),
Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854-1936) added a third category of a Homo mediterraneus
in 1889 to Linnaeus’s classic division of European peoples into blond, dolicocephalic
Homo europaeus (“Aryans” in Lapouge’s terminology) and brown-haired brachycephalic
Homo alpinus. While Lapouge saw “Mediterraneans” as inferior to “Aryans,” one of the
founders of Italian anthropology, Giuseppe Sergi, saw the “Mediterranean race” as the
bedrock  of  European  civilization.  He  also  took  the  unusual  step  of  ascribing
membership  in  the  “Mediterranean  race”  to  both  southern  Europeans  and  some
Africans. However, this move was disowned by his ideological successors like Nicola
Pende and Giacamo Acerbo. For most academics in France and abroad in the early 20th
 century,  “Mediterranean” referred to  Southern Europeans within a  taxonomy (and
hierarchy) of European races.19
14 These  theories  about  a  “Mediterranean  race,”  referring  primarily  to  southern
Europeans, informed the “selectionist” politics of migration experts in both the United
States and France beginning in the 1920s who would allow in some migrants but not
others. For example, Madison Grant (1865-1937) argued that the U.S. should impose
strict quotas on “Mediterranean” migrants from Southern Europe.20 In France, Georges
Mauco’s  1932  doctoral  thesis  on  immigration  made  him  the  country’s  foremost
migration expert and led to a series of government appointments over the next four
decades. Mauco (1899-1988) did not entirely reject the language of Latinity, which he
believed properly referred to ethnicity, the cultural and historic forces that created a
nation. However during World War II and immediately thereafter, he famously (and
unsuccessfully)  proposed  that  racial  categories  should  guide  migratory  policy,
proposing a 50% quota for Germanic or Nordic migrants, 30% for “Mediterraneans,”
and 20% for Slavs.21
 
Anti-colonialism, Fascism, and the Dream of
Federating the Mediterranean
15 For  Mauco,  “Mediterranean  migrants,”  at  least  insofar  as  they  were  somewhat
desirable, referred to southern Europeans, primarily from northern Spain and northern
Italy. However beginning in the 1930s, other authors and policymakers were beginning
to  think  of  a  more  inclusive  Mediterranean.  They  presented  France  as  a  type  of
federation, spanning the Mediterranean and including Algerians and other North and
Sub-Saharan Africans. This vision was most famously articulated by future Nobel-prize-
winning author Albert Camus (1913-1960), beginning in a speech he gave at the Maison
de Culture in Algiers in 1937 and in the Maison’s monthly journal, Jeune Méditerranée.
Camus  drew  not  on  the  work  of  anthropologists  but  literary  celebrations  of  the
Mediterranean circulating in Algiers, the Marseilles-based journal, Cahiers du Sud, and
the works of his contemporary Gabriel Audisio (1900-1978). Wading into debates about
the Blum-Viollette plan to expand the franchise in Algeria and Fascist Italy’s recent war
in Ethiopia, Camus rejected the “Latin” visions of Louis Bertrand and Benito Mussolini
in favor of an international, leftist, and more inclusive “Mediterranean.”22
16 At the same time, senior French ministers and policy-makers were also seeking a means
to respond to the threats of fascist expansion and growing anti-colonialism (and the
prospect that France’s enemies could take advantage of colonial discontent in the event
of  war).  Given that  some of  the  most  prominent  anti-colonial  activists  were  either
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Algerian migrants like Messali Hadj or international actors like Shakib Arslan, a Druze,
living in exile in Geneva and working on issues across the Maghreb, French ministers
adopted an explicitly “Mediterranean” framework. The resulting High Mediterranean
Committee (Haut Comité Méditerranéen), founded in 1935 and reformed in 1936, brought
together academics; the residents and governors general of the colonies; the foreign,
interior, and defense ministers, and the president of the council of ministers (i.e., the
prime minister).23 At the request of  Léon Blum, the High Mediterranean Committee
made  examining  and  reforming  North  African  migration  one  of  its  priorities  for
discussion starting in 1937.24 While proposed reforms were postponed due to World
War II, the Committee’s discussions and drafts ultimately shaped such postwar actions
as the separation of surveillance and social services for North African migrants, as well
as  the expansion of  family allocations to cover migrants  whose children resided in
Algeria.
17 World  War II  reinforced  France’s  dependence  on  migrants  from  the  western
Mediterranean for postwar economic reconstruction and expansion. By 1947 and 1948,
it was clear that German prisoners of war would not be available for continued labor,
that tensions with the Franco dictatorship (which had come to power with the aid of
Hitler and Mussolini) would keep the Spanish border closed for most migrants, and that
Polish and Czech migrants would remain behind the Iron Curtain. Thus French Ministry
of Labor officials and planners like Jean Monnet looked almost exclusively to migrants
from Italy and Algeria. Furthermore, the war had increased the necessity of imperial
reforms. During the war, Allied, Vichy, and Free French forces under Charles de Gaulle
had  competed  for  Algerians’  loyalty,  while  increasing  the  symbolic  and  material
importance  of  the  colonies.  After  the  war,  indigenous  Algerians  were  granted
citizenship, (unequal) voting rights, and the right to freely migrate between Algeria
and metropolitan France. Migration boomed, and Algeria and Italy together supplied
perhaps three-quarters of new migrants in France during the first postwar decade.25
 
Decolonization, European Integration, and the
Reinforcing of European Identity
18 The Algerian War, which raged from November 1954 until Algeria’s independence in
July 1962, challenged understandings of the Mediterranean as a unifying force. During
the war, Camus, Audisio (by then managing press, media, and cultural policies for the
Algerian Government General’s offices in Paris), and others worked to further develop
and articulate their vision of the Mediterranean as uniting metropolitan France and
North Africa.  Ultimately however, their efforts convinced few. On a more quotidian
level, attempts by rival FLN and MNA Algerian nationalist groups to remake migrant
sensibilities and shield their members from their rivals and the French state deepened
the gulf between Algerian migrants and French neighbors and co-workers.26 Moreover,
the intense violence of the conflict, which had seen war carried out on both sides of the
Mediterranean, reinforced stereotypes of violent, “Arab” males. Suspicion of Algerian
migrants was further strengthened after the conflict by the “repatriation” of colonial
bureaucrats  into  the  metropolitan  French  bureaucracy,  where  many  assumed  jobs
responsible for migration.27
19 In  the  long-term,  the  war  and  independence  had  mixed  effects  on  practices  of
migration. On the one hand, it overturned the claim that Algerians were all  French
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citizens and (admittedly fitful and incomplete) policies to deliver on the promise of
republican equality. On the other hand, the Evian Accords ending the Algerian War left
open the possibility of French citizenship for those who desired and even for Algerian
citizens, guaranteed migrants’ non-political rights in France. These were interpreted as
including the right to move, work, reside, and obtain social security benefits.  Given
continued problems in  the  Algerian economy dating from the colonial  era  and the
upheaval caused by the conflict itself, Algerian migrants availed themselves of these
freedoms. The Algerian population in France in fact doubled between 1962 and 1975.28
However in response to Algerian freedoms, French Ministry of Labor officials loosened
restrictions  on  European migrants,  which  particularly  benefited  Italians,  as  well  as
Spaniards and Portuguese in the 1960s.29 These migrants would frequently enter France
as tourists, find a job, and then have their status regularized.
20 At the same time as decolonization was taking place, re-Europeanizing the territories of
states  like  France  and  by  default  ending  citizenship  for  most  non-Europeans,  the
founding  of  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  solidified  ideas  about  a
particularly “European” identity and gave it a new juridical status outside of colonial
contexts. While the EEC was not founded primarily to deal with migration, migration
was always an integral  part  of  the Common Market in goods,  services,  capital,  and
labor. Migration was the topic of articles 48 through 51 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome,
founding the EEC. As a result of the Treaty and a series of implementing regulations
between 1961 and 1968, EEC nationals gained the right to freely move, reside, and take
up paid employment in other EEC countries, subject only to safeguards for order and
public safety. Self-employment and the offering of professional services abroad were
thornier issues to regulate, but gradually restrictions were lifted. EEC migrants gained
access to social rights, such as health insurance, unemployment, disability, and old-age
pensions  on  the  same  terms  as  nationals.  Furthermore  through  the  concept  of
“totalization,”  workers  earned  “credit”  for  work  they  did  in  any  EEC  country  in
determining these  social  benefits.  Together,  these  measures  not  only  ensured legal
equality  amongst  workers,  lest  migrants  undercut  wages,  but  consciously  removed
barriers to movement. In the process, a common European space of labor and welfare
was  begun,  although  different  national  regimes  for  benefits  mean  that  this  space
remains not fully harmonized or uniform to this day.
 
The Mediterranean Beyond Europe
21 As the concept of being “European” was strengthened through decolonization and the
founding of the EEC, that which lay beyond Europe’s frontiers was increasingly defined
as “Mediterranean.” By the 1960s and 1970s, the term “Mediterranean” was frequently
used  in  contradistinction  to  “Europeans”  in  French  governmental  discourses  about
migrants, including those of President de Gaulle himself.30 For example, a Ministry of
Labor  report  in  early  1974  distinguished  between  European  workers/workforce  [la
main-d’œuvre européenne]  and “workers from Mediterranean basin countries.” In this
report,  “European”  countries  included  Southern  European  countries  like  Portugal,
including countries with a Mediterranean coastline like Yugoslavia. In contrast, Turkey
joined the states of North Africa as a “Mediterranean” country. Most tellingly, what
seemed  to  define  whether  a  country  was  “European”  or  “Mediterranean”  was  not
geography  but  the  desirability  of  migrants.  “Mediterranean”  migrants,  the  report
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continued, presented substantial “problems of public order when the concentration of
foreigners  exceeded  certain  limits.”  The  report  thus  validated  then-fashionable
discourses of a “saturation point” (seuil  de tolérance),  which posited that racism and
xenophobia were a natural consequence of the differences between certain migrant
groups and the French population,  manifest  when there  were “too many” of  these
migrants.31
22 Furthermore by the early 1970s, migration was slowly re-emerging as a topic in the
public  consciousness.  Migrant  numbers  were  increasing,  but  just  as  important  was
their changing origin, with increasing numbers coming from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa. These were groups that had long been deemed by the French
public as less able to assimilate. Moreover, the real problems that migrants faced, such
as often appalling housing conditions in shantytowns [bidonvilles], became, in the eyes
of some, evidence that migrants themselves were the problem.32 Against a backdrop of
violence against Algerian migrants and while hosting a meeting of leaders of the Non-
Aligned Movement in the autumn of 1973, Algerian President Boumediene declared a
moratorium on migration, insisting on greater respect for Algerian workers and re-
affirming Algeria’s sovereignty.33
23 The  oil  crisis  later  that  year  and  in  1974  –sparked  by  the  Yom  Kippur  War  and
subsequent oil embargo– likewise presented an opportunity for French bureaucrats and
ministers to publicly demonstrate control over what had until recently been a rather
open  system  of  migration.  The  prospect  of  recession,  higher  prices,  and  rising
unemployment gave bureaucrats and ministers in countries like the Federal Republic of
Germany and France cover to declare an end to migrant recruitment programs.34 EEC
nationals, however, were explicitly spared. While migrants from Spain and Portugal –
both non-EEC members– felt the effects of the moratoriums, they were not targeted at
French borders. Nor were they targeted for incentives to “return” like Algerians.35
24 Migration in France and the Mediterranean Basin did not end in 1973 and 1974, despite
the  declaration  of  moratoriums.  Family  reunification  was  later  permitted,  even
encouraged,  and  refugees  continued  to  seek  asylum.  Moreover,  thousands  of
individuals continued to enter European countries without work or residency visas.
However following the 1968 and 1972 crackdowns on the practice of regularizing the
status of  migrants who had entered France as “tourists” and then found work,  the
moratoriums severely curtailed the opportunities for migrants to obtain legal work and
residence. “Non-European” migrants in particular became increasingly relegated to a
state  of  legal  “clandestinity”  in  the  shadows  of  society,  even  as  migrant  rights
organizations  became  increasingly  vocal  –and  visible.36 Moreover,  the  prolonged
economic crisis created real economic hardships for migrants. Migrants were often the
first to lose their jobs and many sectors of migrant employment, such as construction
and manufacturing, were hard hit by high interest rates, automation, and other long-
term structural changes.
25 Meanwhile in 1973, the EEC admitted new member-states for the first time. This first
wave of EEC enlargement led to the beginnings of a coherent Mediterranean policy, the
so-called “Global  Approach.”  Each of  the  new members  had applied  different  tariff
regimes to products from non-member states in the Mediterranean, which needed to
be harmonized with EEC tariffs.  Moreover,  some of  the association and commercial
agreements with these non-member states were soon due for re-negotiation. European
ministers  decided  to  pursue  a  common  approach  to  non-EEC  countries  in  the
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Mediterranean,  lest  concessions  to  one  state  be  claimed  by  other  states  in  the
Mediterranean  Basin.  Industrial  preferences  were  relatively  easy  to  agree  upon.
Agricultural  negotiations  were  less  productive,  given  competition  between  France,
Italy, and many non-member states in products such as tomatoes, olive oil, wine, and
citrus  fruits.  Furthermore,  the  Algerian  government  sought  a  more  comprehensive
accord that would cover developmental aid and rights for migrants. The failure of the
Mediterranean Global approach to include provisions for migrants and its relatively
modest  success  in  general  confirmed  fears  that  European  enlargement  would  only
increase the gulf between “Europe” and “Mediterranean” countries on issues ranging
from economic to migratory policy.
26 In the 1980s, the EEC expanded again to include Greece, Spain, and Portugal, paving the
way for future enlargement to nearly all countries on the Mediterranean’s northern
shores. The 1985 Schengen Agreement and 1990 Schengen Convention further required
European states to harmonize some of their visa categories and surrender some of their
autonomy  vis-à-vis  third  states  on  issues  of  migration.  While  migration  was  eased
within the EEC/EU with borderless travel, new and less flexible borders were drawn on
its  external  borders.  The  Mediterranean  Basin  was  now  even  more  firmly  divided
between north and south.37 When future President Sarkozy proposed a Mediterranean
Union during his  2007  election campaign,  critics,  such as  the  Turkish  government,
feared  that  it  would  institutionalize  the  Mediterranean  as  a  place  for  those
permanently frozen outside of “Europe” proper. In this light, the words of a Spanish
diplomat  in  1971  become  all  the  more  prescient.  “It  [is]  imperative  that  Spain  be
henceforth  regarded by  its  neighbors  more  as  a  European  country  than  as
Mediterranean.”38 Rather than the cradle of European civilization, the Mediterranean
had become its borderland. Every year the peril  of this border is manifest as up to
40,000 or 60,000 migrants attempt to cross the sea in boats. Perhaps 800 to 1600 drown,
trying to reach “Europe.”39
 
Conclusion
27 In concluding, the study of French discourses about migrants reveals that the referent
for the “Mediterranean” and “Mediterranean migrants” drifted southward during the
course of the 20th century. The Mediterranean went from being roughly synonymous
with southern European geography and Latin culture to something uniting Europe and
its  colonies,  albeit  not  on  entirely  equal  terms.  Finally,  it  became  most  closely
associated with the inhabitants of the sea’s southern and eastern shores. 
28 These shifts reflect in part a series of geopolitical transitions that first challenged and
then dissolved France’s empire while rebuilding and strengthening notions of European
solidarity after two world wars. They also reflect closely related changes in patterns of
migration.  Migrants  to  France  overwhelmingly  came from Italy,  Spain,  Algeria  and
Central Europe during the interwar period and Italy and Algeria in the first post-World
War II  decade.  In  the  late  1950s,  Spain  was  partially  reintegrated  into  European
economic  and  political  exchanges.  Spanish  migration  boomed,  as  did  Portuguese
migration in the late 1960s, even as Italian migration to France slowed to a trickle. In
the 1970s and 1980s however, French immigrants predominantly came from Morocco,
Tunisia, Algeria, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia. 
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29 The timing of these migratory shifts meant that the right to freely migrate as nationals
of the EEC and later European Union was generally obtained after the apogee of Italian,
Spanish, and Portuguese migration. In contrast, subjects of the former colonies have
had  their  access  to  legal  work  and  residence  in  France  slowly  restricted,  even  as
migration  has  increased.  In  both  instances,  the  result  has  been  that  the
“Mediterranean” has remained ever on the margins of “Europe” and “Europeans.” The
recurring  image  of  the  Mediterranean  as  a  space  bringing  together  fundamentally
different  peoples  could  be  aspirational,  emphasizing  fusion  or  peace,  or  it  could
emphasize deep-seated conflict. But the Mediterranean rarely effaced a conviction of
underlying racial differences, and it never escaped the orbit of an increasingly united
Europe, whose borders it continues to reveal.
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ABSTRACTS
Despite  the  fact  that  most  migrants  in  mid-20th century  France  came  from  the  western
Mediterranean,  the  relationship  between  conceptions  of  migrants  and  conceptions  of  the
Mediterranean is poorly understood. This article analyzes both how French policy debates about
migrants borrowed from discourses about the Mediterranean and its inhabitants, as well as how
these debates reveal changing ideas about the Mediterranean as the frontier of “Europe.” To this
end, the article examines four periods of geopolitical reconfigurations when migratory patterns
and policies were reworked: as a result of World War I, in the wake of World War II, during the
1950s and 1960s with decolonization and European integration, and in the midst of economic
crises  and European enlargement since the 1970s.  During the course of  the 20th century,  the
concept  of  the  “Mediterranean  migrant,”  as  well  as  the  “Mediterranean”  itself,  increasingly
referred to persons from the southern shore of the Mediterranean, rather than from Southern
Europe. This shift, in conjunction with an increasingly united Europe, has several implications
for migrants’ inclusion in the nation-state and European Union.
Malgré le fait que la plupart des migrants en France au mitan du XXe siècle soient issus des pays
de la Méditerranée occidentale, la relation entre les conceptions des immigrés et les conceptions
de la Méditerranée reste peu connue. Cet article analyse à la fois comment les débats sur la
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politique migratoire française sont marqués par les discours sur la Méditerranée et ses habitants,
ainsi que la façon dont ces débats révélèrent l’évolution des idées sur « la Méditerranée » comme
frontière  de  « l’Europe ».  A  cette  fin,  l’article  examine  quatre  périodes  de  recompositions
géopolitiques où les circuits et les politiques migratoires furent révisés : à l’issue de la première
guerre mondiale, à la suite de la seconde guerre mondiale, dans les années 1950 et 1960 avec la
décolonisation et  l’intégration européenne,  et  enfin,  au  milieu  des  crises  économiques  et  de
l’élargissement du Marché Commun et l’Union européenne depuis les années 1970. Au cours du
XXe siècle, le concept de « l’immigré méditerranéen », ainsi que celui de « la Méditerranée » elle-
même, se référèrent de plus en plus aux personnes provenant de la rive sud de la Méditerranée,
plutôt qu’à ceux de l’Europe méridionale. Ce changement, dans le contexte d’une Europe de plus
en plus unie, entraîne plusieurs conséquences sur les possibilités d’inclusion des migrants dans
l’État-nation et l’Union européenne.
INDEX
Mots-clés: France, discours, géopolitique, histoire intellectuelle de la Méditerranée,
immigration
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